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A public register on decentralization: why power should move from the few to the many
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№ 79 · appended

Australia's draft rule puts distribution networks into the public charging business, and switches off the ring-fencing rules that keep them out

Ring-fencing is the rule that stops a regulated monopoly using revenue collected from every customer to compete in a market other companies are trying to enter, and this draft rule suspends it for public charging. The access problem it answers is real: renters and apartment residents cannot install a charger because they do not own the parking space. But the answer makes the network the backstop rather than adding operators to the layer, and it defines the monopoly's territory by wherever private operators decline to go, which is a line the network does not draw and does inherit.

The Australian Energy Market Commission published a draft determination on 24 September 2026 in rule change ERC0436, Facilitating EV charging infrastructure rollout under Commonwealth grants. The request came from the Commonwealth Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, and the process was initiated on 28 May 2026. Submissions close on 5 November 2026, and a final determination is due by the end of the year.

The draft rule does two things, and they are worth separating.

The first is an obligation. Participating distribution network service providers would have to support private charge point operators rolling out kerbside charging under the Commonwealth's Accelerating Electric Vehicle Charging Program. Where a metropolitan site is not taken up by an operator, the distributor becomes what the Commission calls the "provider of last resort", installs an AC charger itself, and appoints somebody to run it. In regional areas the distributor installs DC chargers at successful bid locations on the same basis.

The second is an exemption, and it is the part that matters. The draft rule classifies those activities as standard control services. The Commission's own summary says the classification "allows for cost recovery from electricity consumers", and that it stops ring-fencing, restricted asset and normal connection arrangements from applying to the work.

Ring-fencing is not an administrative detail. It is the rule that prevents a regulated monopoly from using revenue collected from every customer to compete in a market that other companies are trying to enter. A distribution network knows where the spare capacity sits, controls the connection queue, and cannot lose money. A charge point operator has none of those three advantages. The ring-fencing guideline exists because, taken together, they are usually enough to decide who wins. This draft rule suspends that reasoning for the duration of one Commonwealth programme.

The access problem being answered is genuine, and the market as it stands does not answer it. The Commission points at regional charging blackspots and at high-density kerbside areas where customers have no off-street parking, which in practice means renters and apartment residents: people who cannot install a charger because they do not own the parking space, and often do not own the wall behind it. A household with a driveway solved this years ago for the price of an outlet. A household without one has been waiting for somebody else's business case to close.

The financial shape of the answer is where the decentralization question actually sits. According to the AEMC's media release, the Commonwealth contributes $40 million, roughly 30 per cent of the cost, with the remaining 70 per cent recovered through network charges at an estimated $1.00 a year for five years per residential customer, for approximately 14,000 chargers. That is a small number per household and a large number in aggregate, and it is collected from everyone, including people who will never plug into a public charger, to build assets in a market that was meant to be contestable.

None of which makes the rule wrong. Universal service obligations funded by everybody are how most countries got a wire to a farmhouse, and the distributional case for kerbside charging in a street of rented flats is at least as strong. But the rule should be described accurately, because the description is what the next argument will be built on. This is not a rule that brings more actors into the charging layer. It is a rule that makes the monopoly the backstop, and it defines the monopoly's territory by wherever private operators decline to go. That is a line the network does not draw, but does inherit, and it will move with every change in the economics of charging. If margins tighten, the residual widens, and the residual is now a regulated asset paid for by everyone.

The programme is scheduled to conclude on 30 June 2029. What the summary documents do not say is what happens on 1 July: whether the chargers stay in the regulated asset base, whether the ring-fencing exemption lapses with the grants, and what a competing operator is then buying into. Submissions close on 5 November, which is when anybody who thinks that question matters has to say so.

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